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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF ]
UTAH, a nonprofit corporation, ]
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

'

Case No. 19676

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH STATE TAX j
COMMISSION, and UTAH STATE
]
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT,
]
Defendants/Respondents.

]

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
Plaintiff and Appellant Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Utah (hereinafter referred to as "Utah Blue Cross" or "Blue
Cross") challenges the constitutionality of the subscription
income tax of Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-9(2) under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

(All references to the Utah Code are to

Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended.)

Utah Blue Cross also

challenges the statute under the Utah Constitution, Article I,
Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26, as a violation of the
requirement of "uniform operation of the laws" and as a "private or special law."

Utah Blue Cross seeks full refund of

$1,674,614.09 paid to the Utah State Tax Commission since March
24, 1982.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
Utah Blue Cross' motion for partial summary judgment
was denied by the Honorable TIMOTHY R. HANSON, Judge, of the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, on October 4, 1983.
spondents

(R. 744-749.)

Defendants and Re-

(hereinafter referred to as "State" or "State of

Utah") submitted a motion for summary judgment on November 10,
1983.

(R. 768-769.)

After hearing arguments by respective

counsel and having considered the memoranda of the parties and
the record, the Honorable J. DENNIS FREDERICK, Judge, of the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, granted the State's motion on December 6, 1983.

(R.

788-789.) Utah Blue Cross appeals.
RELIEE SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State seeks affirmance of the judgment and order
of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, in this matter.
STATEMENT OE THE EACTS
The

Defendant,

Utah State Tax Commission,

is an

agency of the State of Utah charged with the general supervision of the tax laws of the State of Utah.

The Defendant, Utah

Insurance Department, is an agency of the State of Utah charged
with the execution of laws relating to insurers doing business
in the State of Utah.
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Blue Cross is a nonprofit health service corporation
operating in the State of Utah in accordance with the terms and
provisions of the Nonprofit Hospital, Medical-Surgical, Dental,
and Health Service Corporation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-37-1
to -26.

As such, Utah Blue Cross is authorized to make avail-

able to its subscribers all the services provided by hospitals
or licensed health care institutions, and by licensed doctors
and nurses.

In addition, Utah Blue Cross is authorized to make

drugs, medicine and other health services available to its
subscribers.

Utah Blue Cross is not allowed to provide any

form of casualty or life insurance coverage to its subscribers.
Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-15.

All health service corporations

organized pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-37-1 to -26 are
subject to a tax of 2 1/4% on the subscription income they
receive from the contracts covering risks in the State of Utah.
Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4(1).
There are also present in the State a number of other
types of insurance companies, including six associations organized as mutual benefit associations (hereinafter referred to as
"MBAs") in accordance with the Mutual Benefit Association Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-31-1 to -15. This Act was repealed by the
legislature in 1969 Utah Laws, Chapter 74, Section 8.

Since

the repeal of the Mutual Benefit Association Act, the Commissioner of Insurance may not issue licenses permitting companies
to operate under the provisions of Chapter 31 of Title 31 of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Insurance Code.

MBAs in existence at the time of the repeal

of the Act were specifically grandfathered by 1969 Utah Laws,
Chapter 74, Section 8.

Those mutual benefit associations still

in existence were and continue to be organized for the purpose
of providing benefits to members or beneficiaries of members.
In accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4(1), a tax
similar to that imposed upon Utah Blue Cross is imposed upon
"[e]very insurance company engaged in the transaction of business in this state. . . . "

Like Utah Blue Cross, insurance

companies must pay a tax of 2 1/4% of total premiums they
receive

annually

from insurance covering property or risks

located in the State of Utah.

The tax on premium income levied

by Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4(1) is not levied on "premiums on
policies which have been or will be issued by domestic benefit
[MBAs], or co-operative benefit associations."
Other relevant facts and testimony that the State
plans

to

utilize

are

incorporated

in

the

argument.

The

State would like to point out that the section of the appellant's

brief

entitled

"Material

Facts"

is

argumentative,

misleading, full of legal conclusions and distorts the facts.
The

State will

treat

that

section

as part of appellant's

argument.
ISSUE
The single issue presented by this appeal is whether
the grandfathered MBAs and Utah Blue Cross are so similarly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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situated that the legislative choice to treat the two differently for tax purposes is so unreasonable as to violate the
Utah and United States Constitutions as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROPER STANDARD OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN TAX CASES
IS TO GIVE GREAT DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS.
The State agrees with Utah Blue Cross that no "higher
standard of constitutional review" than the "rational basis"
standard is applicable to this case.
16-17.

Appellant's brief at

The "rational basis" standard is the standard of the

greatest deference to legislative choice.

The standard has

recently been stated by this Court as follows:
When neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved, equal protection requires that
statutory classifications bear a reasonable relation
to the purpose sought to be accomplished and that
there be a reasonable basis for the distinction
between the classes. Classifications are not unreasonable or arbitrary as long as similarly situated
people are dealt with in a similar manner and people
situated differently are not treated as if their
circumstances were the same.
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982).

There-

fore, if the State can show any rational reason for classifying
Utah Blue Cross differently from the MBAs and there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the purpose
of the classification, the statute must be upheld.
As Utah Blue Cross noted at pages 28-29 of its brief,
the standard of review is identical under each of the three
constitutional
provisions argued by Utah Blue Cross. The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Federal Constitutional provision is under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The two provisions under

the Utah Constitution are the requirement of "uniform operation of the laws," Article I, Section 24, and the prohibition
against "private or special laws," Article VI, Section 26.

If

the statute is invalid under any one of these constitutional
provisions, it is invalid under all three.

The converse is

also true.
While there is no dispute that the standard to be
applied is the "rational basis" test, the method of applying
that test differs under some circumstances.

For example, in

tax cases the courts uniformly apply the rule of great deference

to

legislative

classification.

The

Supreme

Court of

Wisconsin in Simanco v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 57 Wis.2d
47, 203 N.W.2d 648 (1973), dealt with an equal protection challenge to a tax statute.

After recognizing that the burden of

proof on a challenger to the constitutionality of a statute is
"heavy indeed", the court went on to note that "where a tax
measure is involved, the presumption of constitutionality is
strongest."

M.

at

54, 651.

The

court discussed

a long

"series of uninterrupted cases" from the Supreme Court of the
United States holding that "[t]he States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes" and that "[i]f the selection or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary,
and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or
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policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of the law."
I_d.

at

55-56,

652,

quoting

Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v.

Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959).

See also, Dandridge v.

Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Walters v. City of St. Louis,
347 U.S. 231 (1954); Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920).
In a similar case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
"[A] legislature has much more leeway in granting exemptions in
taxation statutes than it does in regulatory measures enacted
under its police power without running athwart of the equalprotection-of-the-laws

clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment."

Associated Hospital Service, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee,
Wis.2d 447, 470, 109 N.W.2d 271, 282 (1961).

13

In Leo Feist,

Inc. v. Young, 46 F.Supp. 622, 629 (E.D.Wis. 1942), the court
stated that "[t]he court must presume that legislation [sic]
distinctions have been made on a rational basis if there is any
conceivable state of facts which would support it."

The burden

is on the appellant Utah Blue Cross to demonstrate that no
rational reason can be conceived for treating Utah Blue Cross
differently from the MBAs.

Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d

466, 469, (10th Cir. 1972).

Because Utah Blue Cross has not

carried and cannot hope to carry this burden under any version
of the facts, the court below acted properly in granting summary judgment to the State.
POINT II
THERE IS A RATIONAL BASIS REASONABLY RELATED TO THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF PERMISSIBLE STATE POLICIES FOR CLASSIFYING
UTAH BLUE CROSS DIFFERENTLY FROM THE GRANDFATHERED MBAS.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Besides the most obvious differences between the MBAs
and Utah Blue Cross tabulated in Appendix A to this brief and
those appearing in the Record at pages 108-115, a number of
significant reasons exist for distinguishing between the two.
In addition, there is a third group that must be considered, a
group that is not party to this proceeding.

That group con-

sists of the more than twelve hundred insurers in the State of
Utah subject to taxation.

(R. 509-511, 632-634.) The legisla-

ture classified the different types of insurance providers for
regulatory, administrative and fiscal reasons.

Those classifi-

cations were based upon study and deliberation; they were not
arbitrary or capricious.

This Court should be slow to invali-

date the legislative scheme.
A.

The Statutory Distinctions of Title 31 of Utah
Code Ann, are Eacially Nondiscriminatory?
On its face, Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-9(2), the chal-

lenged tax statute, is general in application.

That section

provides:
(2) There shall be paid to the state tax commission by every corporation subject to the provisions
of this act a tax of 2 1/4% of the total subscribtion
income received by it during the next preceding
calendar year from contracts covering risks in this
state less the amount of all subscription income
returned or credited to subscribers on direct business in this state.
1.

The tax is imposed on every
chapter 37 corporation.

By its express terms, the tax applies to every corporation subject
to the provisions of title 31, chapter 37.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Chapter 37 applies to certain types of entities that are neither commercial insurance companies nor traditional corporations.

As

such, those

entities

are

allowed benefits not

available to, and are subjected to burdens not imposed on,
entities not incorporated under chapter 37-

These topics will

be developed more completely in subsequent portions of the
brief.

At this point it is important to recognize that the

MBAs cannot incorporate under chapter 37 without significantly
altering both their methods of operation and the types of
services offered.

Conversely, Utah Blue Cross cannot continue

to offer the services it presently offers unless it complies
with the provisions of chapter 37.

Utah Blue Cross is, there-

fore, placed in the position of arguing that it may be treated
differently from the MBAs for all purposes other than tax
purposes.

This argument must fail.
2.

The tax is not a special law directed at
Utah Blue Cross alone.

By the use of its own name as a shorthand for corporations subject to chapter 37, Utah Blue Cross implies, although
it does not expressly state, that it is alone in being taxed on
subscription income.

The allegation that the tax is a special

law directed at Utah Blue Cross, however, is express. This is
not the case.
The legislative record of the 1969 passage of the
Nonprofit

Hospital,

Medical-Surgical,

Dental,

and

Health

Service Corporation Act, chapter 37 of title 31, contains many
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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references indicating that the aim of the statute was not to
single out Utah Blue Cross for special treatment.

At the time

the Act was passed, at least four such corporations were in
existence, and the legislature anticipated the future incorporation of other health service corporations.
658.)

(R. 651, 654-655,

One of those four corporations, the Delta Plan, is still

in existence but is in receivership.

Thus, this case is not

like Continental Bank & Trust v. Farmington City, 599 P.2d 1242
(Utah 1979), a case heavily relied on by Utah Blue Cross.
Continental Bank

a

tax

statute

specifically

and

In

expressly

tailored to one amusement park, Lagoon, was struck down as
violative of equal protection rights.

No such improper classi-

fication of a single entity is involved here.
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-9(2) is constitutionally
valid even if Utah Blue Cross is the only
corporation regulated by it.

Since the merger of Blue Cross of Utah and Blue
Shield of Utah into Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah on
January 1, 1982, (R. 439), Utah Blue Cross may be the only
corporation

presently

operating

under

chapter

37

in Utah.

However, even if Utah Blue Cross is alone in that respect, the
challenged statute does not deny equal protection of the law.
In Continental Bank,

the

Lagoon

case,

this Court

invalidated a tax only after finding that it represented such
an improper classification that its operation became "discriminatory, arbitrary, and an abuse of the taxing power."
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599

P.2d at 1245.
case.

No such finding could be made in the present

Ample evidence shows that no legislative design to tax

Utah Blue Cross unfairly existed at the time the questioned
statute was passed.

See, subsection II B. below.

Subsequent

changes in the business climate cannot render a legislative act
that was reasonable when passed an abuse of discretion.

Fur-

ther, this Court cautioned in Continental Bank that "[t]here
are cases where a single, unique business entity has constituted a proper class for taxation purposes.

In fact, this

Court has specifically sustained the idea that a classification
which comprises a single business entity does not per se render
the classification unreasonable."

Id. at 1245.

In so deciding, this Court relied on the cases of
Salt Lake City Lines v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 428, 315 P.2d
859 (1957), and Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Railway Co., 45
Utah 50, 142 P. 1067 (1914).

Both cases involved legislative

classification of single entities.

This Court upheld those

classifications as reasonable because the entities so classified were unique.
United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Insurance
Corp., 400 U.S. 4 (1970), illustrates the great deference to
legislative enactments that the Supreme Court of the United
States has mandated under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

In that case, deposit insurance compa-

nies that were concededly identical in all respects except for
the dates of their incorporation were classified differently
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for federal income tax purposes.

Four deposit insurance compa-

nies created before the cutoff date of September 1, 1957, were
tax-exempt under a specific statutory provision.

One deposit

insurance company, the Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corp.,
was created after the cutoff, and was, thus, subject to taxation.

Maryland Savings attacked the application of the tax to

it under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The United States Supreme Court found the purpose of the

-cutoff statute to be to discourage Maryland Savings and others
from

forming deposit insurance companies.

This purpose was

rational in view of the federal policy to eliminate competition
for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Therefore, the

Supreme Court upheld the tax despite the fact that it fell on
only one of five state deposit insurance companies.
It is clear that if there is any rational basis for
classifying health service corporations differently from MBAs.,
the classification is not invalid simply because there is only
one health service corporation in the state at any given time.
B.

The Legislative History of the Challenged Statute
Reveals That Utah Blue Cross is Not Unfairly
Taxed.
"
~~~.

The legislative history of the entire development of
the insurance code is set forth in detail in the State's "Statement of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" submitted to the court
below.

(R. 466-476, 589-599.)

In addition, the legislative
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debate concerning the challenged tax statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 31-37-9(2), is set out at length in the record beginning at
pages 514 and 637.

This discussion will focus on only those

parts of the record which illustrate that the legislature had a
rational basis for taxing health service corporations differently from the MBAs.
1.

The State legislature recognized that Utah Blue
Cross is different from the MBAs.

In 1969 the Utah Insurance Code underwent a major
revision.

As a part of that revision, the old MBA statutes

were repealed, but MBAs already in existence were specifically
grandfathered.

1969 Utah Laws, Chapter 74, Section 8.

Also as

a part of that revision, the "Non-Profit Hospital Service Plans
Act," (chapter 30 of title 31) under which Utah Blue Cross had
been

regulated

since

1947, was replaced by the "Nonprofit

Hospital, Medical-Surgical, Dental, and Health Service Corporation Act," the present chapter 37 of title 31. Utah Blue Cross
had a hand in drafting the bill that became the Act.

(R. 642.)

The bill did not contain a taxing provision when it was submitted to the legislature.
lative committee.

That provision was added by the legis-

(R. 637-640.)

Some of the representatives

voiced the opinion that they had "broken faith" with Utah Blue
Cross by changing the "agreement" by amendment.

(R. 640.)

The concern was expressed that the tax would have to
apply to the MBAs as well as to the health service corporations.

The legislature indicated that the law should not be so
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interpreted.

(R. 646-647, 650.)

In so doing, the legislature

recognized the fraternal nature of the MBAs and their specific
differences

from Utah Blue Cross.

Just one week later, on

March 13, 1969, the same legislature voted to repeal the MBA
statutes and to grandfather existing MBAs.
lature perceived

Clearly, the legis-

a fundamental difference between Utah Blue

Cross and the MBAs.
The legislature expressed the concern that Utah Blue
Cross and other health service corporations were being given an
unfair tax advantage over commercial insurance companies subject to a premium tax.

The subscription tax of Utah Code Ann.

§ 31-37-9(2) was expressly intended to remedy this situation.
The legislature decided that Utah Blue Cross' business more
closely

resembled

the business of the commercial

companies than it did that of the MBAs.

insurance

As such, the legisla-

ture decided that it was fair to subject Utah Blue Cross and
others enjoying the same benefits as Utah Blue Cross to a tax
identical to the tax levied against the more than twelve hundred other insurers in the state.

(R. 643-645, 632-633.)

In deciding to tax the nonprofit organizations, the
legislature was following a trend in this country of questioning the charitable status of Blue Cross organizations.

Repre-

sentative Mecham pointed out that eight states had already
passed

legislation

taxing

Blue

Cross programs.

(R. 665.)

See also, Borland v. Bayonne Hospital, 122 N.J.Super. 387, 300
A.2d 584 (1973)(holding Blue Cross plans to be non-charitable);
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Associated Hospital Service, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis.
*d 447, 109 N.W.2d 271 (1961) (holding Blue Cross plans to
**«» charitable).
The purpose of the legislature in passing the challenged t.ci>: Wii: t (J equalize the tax but den.

In the words of

Representative Mecham, the tax was intended to make it so that
"we all get the even bite of taxes."

(R. 666.)

Representative

Mecham concluded his speech supporting the tax as follows:

"So

-going back to this old proposition of equality in taxes, I
think your vote should rest on that, and let's vote to equalize
taxes."
views.

(R. 666.)

Other representatives

expressed

similar

Surely, a purpose to equalize taxes between similarly

situated entities is a rational objective, and the m^ in:-, chosen
to obtain that objective is tailored to that end. The State
submits that this objective alone is sufficient to defeat Utah
Blue Cross' claims.
C.

The History of Utah Blue Cross Demonstrates
the Need to Treat Utah Blue Cross Differently
From the MBAs.

At

least

as

early

as 1947, the Utah legislature

recognized a distinction between Utah Blue Cross (then separate
from Utah Blue Shield) and all other insurance companies including

fraternal

organization

esignated

as MBAs.

(R. 471.)

Since 1969, the State has taxed nonprofit hospital service
corporations (which then included Utah Blue Cross and Utah Blue
Shield as separate entities) and cummer rial insurance companies.

At the same time, MBAs have remained exempt from the
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tax.

(R. 472.)

The history and method of operation of Blue

Cross type organizations illustrate the reasons for the distinction.
1.

Utah Blue Cross is not an insurance company.

The following excerpt is taken from Utah Blue Cross'
brief on appeal at page 7:
Utah Blue Cross is a nonprofit health
service corporation operating pursuant to the provisions of the Nonprofit Health Service Corporation
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-1 et se_g. (R. 2, 31). As
such, Utah Blue Cross provides payment for health,
accident and other medically related expenses incurred by its subscribers. Utah Blue Cross provides
this service to members of the public both individually and through group plans. In essence then, Utah
Blue Cross is a nonprofit provider of health and
disability insurance. (R. 240).
This

statement,

strictly

speaking,

is

incorrect.

Utah Blue Cross bases its entire argument upon the premise that
it is an insurance provider in the same sense that the MBAs are
insurance providers.

As the following discussion will demon-

strate, the premise is false.
Health care service plans made their first appearance
in this country in the late 1920's when it became clear that
the country was facing a health care crisis.

The great depres-

sion increased the problem, and "a vast number of the population

[had

to] go without needed medical attention."

See,

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan v. Demlow, 403 Mich. 399,
419-420,

270 N.W.2d

845, 850

(1978).

Private health care

service organizations were formed for the purpose of making
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

health care available to a greater number of persons.

The

first such organization was the plan established by the Baylor
University Hospital in Dallas, Texas, in 1929. Associated Hospital Service, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis.2d 447, 454,
109 N.W.2d 271, 274 (1961).
These plans provided for prepaid medical services as
opposed to indemnification for medical expenses incurred.

The

plans did well, but were faced with some judicial obstacles
early on.

They were accused of operating as insurance compa-

nies without complying with insurance laws and of practicing
medicine without a license.

While most courts rejected the

idea that the plans were insurance companies, some courts did
not.

The confusion lead to the passage of special enabling

statutes to allow the plans to operate outside of the state
insurance

regulations.

cited within).

Demlow, at 421-422, 851

(see cases

Without the enabling statutes, Utah Blue Cross

would not be allowed to operate in the way it does.

This is a

great benefit to Utah Blue Cross.
The

distinction

between

indemnity

insurance

prepaid medical services is real, not illusory.

and

Utah Blue

Cross operates in a manner quite different from the MBAs.

Utah

Blue Cross' operations involve two types of contractural relationships.

The first, and most significant, is the contract

between Utah Blue Cross and Utah hospitals and physicians.
Those hospitals and physicians that contract with Utah Blue
Cross, called participating providers, agree to provide free
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medical services to Utah Blue Cross subscribers.

In return,

Utah Blue Cross agrees to pay to the providers a fee set by the
UCR ("usual, customary and reasonable") method for each specific service rendered.

The participating providers agree to

accept the set fee as payment in full for the service rendered.
Nonparticipating providers receive payment from Blue Cross for
services rendered to subscribers through the subscribers, but
only to the extent of the fixed fee for each service rendered.
The other contract is between Utah Blue Cross and the subscribers.

The subscribers pay a fixed fee, usually monthly, as a

prepayment for medical services.

This method of operation is

set out in detail in the cases of Demlow, Associated Hospital
Service, and Insurance Commissioner of Maryland v. Blue Shield,
456 A.2d 914 (Md. 1983).

None of the MBAs do business in this

manner.
From the above it is clear that Utah Blue Cross is
not an insurance provider.

Although Utah Blue Cross is in the

same market as the insurance companies, a fact recognized by
the legislature when it decided to tax health service corporations, it provides health services, not indemnification.
courts have recognized the

Many

"unique" position of Blue Cross

plans and the fact that Blue Cross is not an insurance company.
Besides those cases already cited above, the following cases
have reached a similar conclusion:

Karaskiewicz v. Blue Cross

and Blue Shield, 336 N.W.2d 757 (Mich.App. 1983); Blue Cross
and Blue Shield v. Insurance Bureau,

104

Mich.App.
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113,

304

N.W.2d 499 (1981); Blue Cross of Kansas, Inc. v. Bell, 227 Kan.
426, 607 P.2d 498 (1980).
Utah Blue Cross counters this argument by asserting
that the difference

is only "administrative" and that the

contract between the subscribers and Utah Blue Cross looks like
any other insurance contract if the contracts with the providers are ignored.

See, Appellants Brief at 30-33.

This

argument is without merit.
The argument that the provider contracts are separate
and distinct from the subscriber contracts for purposes of this
action is based on a selective and skewed reading of Group
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
The issues of that case are so different from those involved in
this case that comparison serves no purpose.

Even so, the

dictum of that case that the agreements between the providers
and Utah Blue Cross are not "the business of insurance" supports the State's conclusion rather than that of Utah Blue
Cross.

In any case, to ignore half of the operation of Utah

Blue Cross in order to make the other half look the way Utah
Blue Cross would like it to be viewed for purposes of this
litigation is to look so closely at the hole as to miss the
doughnut.
In Salt Lake City Lines v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d
428, 315 P.2d 859

(1957), this Court rejected an argument

similar to that now advanced by Utah Blue Cross.
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Salt Lake

City Lines challenged, on equal protection grounds, a statute
that taxed only Salt Lake Lines.
challenge.

This Court rejected the

The classification was found to be reasonable even

though Salt Lake Lines was the only entity subject to the tax
because it was the only entity in the State licensed to operate
electric vehicles for mass transportation purposes.

Salt Lake

Lines argued that because it had ceased to operate any electrical vehicles in 1947, its operation of motor buses was not
different from other mass transportation companies' operations.
This argument failed.

This Court stated .that "[t]he ordinance

gives the company a 50-year right to use city streets to operate electric vehicles of two types, . . . " and that "[njonuse
of one part of a multiprivileged franchise does not destroy the
others."

Id.

at 432, 861-862.

Similarly,

in

determining

whether there is any rational basis for treating Utah Blue
Cross differently from the MBAs, all of Utah Blue Cross' operations must be considered.
A survey of the Articles of Incorporation of Utah
Blue Cross sheds some added light.

The purposes of Utah Blue

Cross are set forth in Article IX of the plan of consolidation
of Blue Cross of Utah and Blue Shield of Utah.
Conspicuous

(R. 440-442.)

in this statement of the purposes of Utah Blue

Cross is the absence of the word "insurance" in any of its
forms.

Instead, the purposes are stated to be "[t]o secure the

general, economic, and timely availability of hospital, medicalsurgical, dental, and other health services. . . ," and "to
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make available to such subscribers and others hospital care,
medical-surgical care, dental care, and other health service
care . . . ," and "[t]o enter into contracts for the rendering
of

hospital services, medical-surgical services, dental ser-

vices or other health services . . . ."

.Id. (emphasis added).

This language was not chosen inadvisedly by Utah Blue Cross.
It was chosen carefully in order to comply with and gain the
benefits of the Nonprofit Hospital, Medical-Surgical, Dental,
and Health Service Corporation Act, Chapter 37 of Title 31 of
Utah Code Ann.

As may be seen, Utah Blue Cross wishes to be

considered the equivalent of an insurance company only for the
purposes of this tax litigation.
The argument that the difference is only "an internal
administrative

difference"

and that Utah Blue

Cross could

choose to operate like the MBAs, or, conversely, that the MBAs
could choose to operate like Utah Blue Cross, is without merit.
The MBAs simply could not choose to operate through contractual
arrangements with providers to provide health services without
complying with the provisions of chapter 37, title 31 of Utah
Code Ann., including the tax provision of that chapter.

Simi-

larly, Utah Blue Cross could not operate as an insurance company without complying with
insurance code.

the general provisions of the

The MBAs and Utah Blue Cross do operate dif-

ferently and the fact that either could choose to incorporate
under a different statute in order to be like the other does
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not change the present fact that they are different.
neutral legislation can treat differently

Facially

situated entities

differently without offending equal protection policies.
Utah Blue Cross makes a similar argument in answer to
the State's assertion that one of the differences between the
MBAs and Utah Blue Cross is that Utah Blue Cross cannot provide
life insurance or annuity type contracts.
37-15.

Utah Code Ann. § 31-

Utah Blue Cross states at pages 35-36 of their brief:

'"Utah Blue Cross, if it chose to, could provide life insurance
and annuities upon complying with these [meaning chapter 22 of
title 31] and any other applicable statutory provisions."
statement, itself, defeats Utah Blue Cross' argument.

This

If Utah

Blue Cross complied with the provisions of chapter 22, it would
be subject to the insurance tax imposed by chapter 14 of title
31.

On the other hand, the MBAs are already subject to chapter

22 ( See, Utah Code Ann. § 31-22-1.4), but are exempted from
the insurance tax by the operation of Utah Code Ann. § 31-144(1).

Again, the legislative distinctions are based on the

differences between entities operating under and receiving the
benefits of different chapters of the insurance code.

They are

not based on whether Utah Blue Cross or the MBAs have the power
to operate differently than they presently do.
Operating under chapter 37, Utah Blue Cross enjoys
benefits not available to the MBAs or to commercial insurance
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companies.

There are ample reasons for treating Utah Blue

Cross like the "unique" entity it is.
2.

Utah Blue Cross enjoys the benefits of being
a chapter 37 corporation.

Because of Utah Blue Cross' unique position in the
health field, Utah Blue Cross enjoys a number of benefits not
shared by commercial insurance companies or by the MBAs.

See,

Insurance Commissioner of Maryland v. Blue Shield,

A.2d

914, 919 (Md. 1983).

456

Besides being subject to different fee

schedules, procedural requirements and regulatory controls, the
most significant benefit enjoyed by Utah Blue Cross stems from
the statutory mandate allowing Utah Blue Cross to contract
directly with the hospitals and doctors of the State to provide
health services. Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-8.

The MBAs and other

commercial insurance companies do not enjoy this benefit.

As

was already noted above, health service plans were not able to
operate

without specific

enabling

statutes

in some states

because of their noncompliance with the insurance codes and
because they were held to be practicing medicine without a
license.

Insurance Commissioner of Maryland at 919-920; Asso-

ciated Hospital Service, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee,

13

Wis.2d

447, 472, 109 N.W.2d 271, 283 (1961).
In Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan v. Demlow, 403
Mich. 399, 270 N.W.2d 845 (1978), the Supreme Court of Michigan
recognized that Blue Cross "is not an insurance company in the
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I

usual sense of the term."

That court's finding was as follows:

BCBSM [Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan] has a
direct and distinct contractual relationship both
with its subscribers and with the participating
providers. Other entities in the health care protection field, most notably health insurance companies, do not enjoy such a position. They have a
contractual relationship only with their policyholders. Unlike BCBSM, they do not have direct access to
both sides of the health care equation.
Id. at 417, 849.

Having access to both sides of the health

care equation is an advantage of such worth that its importance cannot be overstated.
The advantage that Utah Blue Cross enjoys stems from
the direct contractual relationship between the providers and
Utah Blue Cross.

A simple example will illustrate the point.

When a Utah Blue Cross subscriber receives services from a
provider, the provider has no claim for payment against the
subscriber.

Instead, the provider has a direct claim against

Utah Blue Cross.

Contrasted with this is the position of the

provider in a case where the provider renders the same services
to a patient insured by an MBA or by a commercial insurance
company.

In such a case, the provider has a direct claim

against the insured, and only a derivative claim against the
insurance company.

It is not difficult to recognize the advan-

tage enjoyed by Utah Blue Cross as a result of this arrangement.
There is a strong incentive for hospitals and doctors
to participate in the Blue Cross plans.

The claim against the
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deeper pocket and the assurance that such a claim provides are
obvious advantages over the alternative-

Further, there is an

incentive for individuals to subscribe to a Blue Cross plan and
to select a doctor or a hospital that is a participating provider.

When a subscriber selects a participating provider, the

subscriber can rest assured that Utah Blue Cross will be liable
for the entire cost of any services rendered.

On the other

hand, if a subscriber selects a nonparticipating provider, the
subscriber will be liable for amounts charged by that provider
in excess of the UCR amount prescribed by Utah Blue Cross.
This is also an added incentive for providers to participate in
the plan.
The Utah legislature recognized this advantage when
deciding to tax Utah Blue Cross equally with other insurance
companies.

For example, Representative Gunnell pointed out

that "a lot of testimony" was presented to the legislative
council "as to the price of premiums [,] as to the degree of
coverage, as to the competitive benefits that were enjoyed by
this organization [Utah Blue Cross] that were not enjoyed by
others."

Representative Gunnell concluded that "it would be

absolutely fair in light of the competitive situation that
exists in the insurance industry" to tax Utah Blue Cross equally

with

insurance

companies.

(R. 644-645.)

In addition,

Representative Workman stated that the Blue Cross movement is
"a movement that none of the rest of the businessmen that I
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know of have the benefit of, and that's more or less a guarantee of your accounts receivable."

(R. 666-667.)

Therefore,

the legislature, in order to reduce the competitive advantage
Utah Blue Cross and similar health service corporations enjoyed
over other insurance providers, voted to eliminate the unfair
tax-exempt

status

of health

service

corporations.

Such a

purpose is not only rational, it is laudable.
To illustrate the reality of the business advantage
enjoyed by Utah Blue Cross, it is interesting to note that Utah
Blue Cross presently has contracted with approximately 80% of
the physicians and 100% of the licensed hospitals in the State
of Utah.

In Kansas, Blue Cross has contracts with 94% of the

physicians and 100% of the hospitals, and serves approximately
51% of the Kansas population.

Blue Cross of Kansas v. Bell,

227 Kan. 426, 428-429, 607 P.2d 498, 501-502 (1980).

In Michi-

gan, Blue Cross has contracts with approximately 95% of the
hospitals and 65% of the physicians, and serves roughly 60% of
the Michigan population.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan

v. Demlow, 403 Mich. 399, 419, 270 N.W.2d 845, 850 (1978).
Similar figures could probably be obtained in most, if not all,
of the states in the union.

Such information persuaded the

Court of Appeals of Michigan to conclude that
enjoys

substantial

government benefit."

"Blue Cross

Blue Cross and Blue

Shield v. Insurance Bureau, 104 Mich.App. 113, 132, 304 N.W.2d
499, 507 (1981).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Another benefit enjoyed by Utah Blue Cross that is
not enjoyed by the MBAs is Utah Blue Cross1 intimate connection
with federal Medicare and Medicaid.

In Salt Lake City, Medicare

is administered by Utah Blue Cross, and the two are housed in
the same building.

Medicare uses a method of payment similar

to that used by Utah Blue Cross.

A set fee for any given

service is paid by Medicare to eligible recipients.

If this

fee is below the amount that Utah Blue Cross is obligated to
.pay for the same service, Utah Blue Cross pays only the difference (between Medicare's set fee and its set fee) to the provider of the service on behalf of its subscribers.

This rela-

tionship makes Utah Blue Cross type plans advantageous for the
elderly.
Utah Blue Cross has accepted the benefits of special
enabling statutes in Utah since 1947 and has paid the tax
imposed by section 9(2) of chapter 37 of title 31 without
protest since 1969.

Utah Blue Cross should not now be allowed

to question the validity of statutes under which it has received

substantial

benefits.

A similar situation was pre-

sented to this Court in Salt Lake City Lines v. Salt Lake City,
6 Utah 2d 428, 315 P.2d 859 (1957).

Salt Lake City Lines

operated under a franchise and paid a license tax for approximately ten

(10) years before questioning the constitutional

validity of the tax.

This Court stated:

"All of the conten-

tions mentioned seem to be vulnerable to the general proposi-
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tion that one accepting the benefits of legislation, ordinarily
is speechless in denouncing its validity, even on constitutional grounds."

^d. at 431, 860-861; see, Fahey v. Mallonee, 332

U.S. 245, 255 (1947); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Justice Brandeis, concurring).

This

Court stated that Salt Lake City Lines could not be allowed to
"[live] within the legislation's mansion" and yet claim that it
"need pay no board simply because [it had] not signed a meal
ticket."
in

Such a holding would "flout reason and strap the law

a straightjacket

laced with unreasonable

Salt Lake City Lines at 861.

technicality."

Similarly, Utah Blue Cross should

not be allowed to accept the benefits, but escape the burdens,
of chapter 37.
D.

The Utah Legislature Acted Rationally in
Grandfathering the MBAsT

Utah Blue Cross chooses to ignore the fact that there
are more than twelve hundred insurers in the State that are
taxed the same as Utah Blue Cross and focuses on the six remaining MBAs that are not taxed.

Utah Blue Cross argues that it is

so similarly situated to the MBAs that it is denied equal
protection if it is taxed and the MBAs are not. However, Utah
Blue Cross admits that if there is any rational reason for
treating the MBAs differently than Utah Blue Cross, its appeal
must fail.

Appellant's brief at 16-17.

The State submits that

grandfathering the fraternal organizations known as MBAs was a
rational act.
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When the legislature perceived that the need for MBAs
had passed, it was faced with the problem of what to do with
existing MBAs.
recognized

In eliminating MBAs, the legislature probably

the hardship

that would have been visited upon

members of existing MBAs if those organizations were disbanded.
Not the least of the legislature's worries may have been the
possible violation of the due process of law clause of the
United States Constitution if the legislature acted to eliminate property benefits which the MBA members had purchased and
on which they had a right to rely.

Other valid and reasonable

considerations likely also entered into the decision to grandfather the MBAs.

Utah Blue Cross does not argue that there was

no valid reason for grandfathering MBAs, nor could they.

In-

stead, Utah Blue Cross asserts that it is so similarly situated to the MBAs for tax purposes, that a tax on Utah Blue
Cross that is not also levied against the MBAs is an abuse of
the taxing power.

Even if the position of Utah Blue Cross for

tax purposes were identical to that of the MBAs, which it
clearly is not, this argument would fail on the authority of
United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corp., 400 U.S.
4 (1970).
In Maryland Savings, a tax that grandfathered certain
insurance companies was challenged on constitutional grounds.
Maryland Savings, which was concededly identical to the four
grandfathered

deposit

insurance

companies

in
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every respect

except for the date of incorporation, argued that the cutoff
date was arbitrary and an abuse of the taxing power.

The United

States Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of the tax was
expressly to discourage Maryland Savings and others from incorporating after the cutoff date, in order to eliminate competition to the federal deposit insurance corporation.

The Court

found the purpose reasonable and the method of achieving the
purpose rationally related to the end sought.

In upholding the

tax, the Court said that "a legislative classification will not
be set aside if any state of facts rationally justifying it is
demonstrated to or perceived by the courts."
added).

Id. at 6 (emphasis

Therefore, even if Utah Blue Cross were identically

situated with respect to the MBAs, the classification scheme
would be valid if there were any rational reason to grandfather
the MBAs.

The State submits that there were ample justifica<

tions for grandfathering MBAs.
Utah Blue Cross argues that it must compete with the
MBAs for business and that the tax is an unfair disadvantage.
<

That the tax is a disadvantage is clear.

Whether it is unfair

is another issue.
A primary purpose of the taxes imposed by both Utah
i
Code Ann. §§ 31-14-4(1) and 31-37-9(2) is the raising and
producing of revenue for the State of Utah.

While there may be

some incidental regulatory purposes in the imposition of the
insurance taxing system, the overriding purpose appears to be
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the production of income.

While the subscription based income

tax assessed against Blue Cross is doubtless a cost of that
corporation's doing business in Utah which must be included in
setting rates for subscribers, the premium tax imposed upon
other insurance companies by section 31-14-4(1) is similarly a
cost of doing business for those organizations and will be
reflected in their rates as offered to policy holders.
MBAs are not taxed in the same manner as insurance
companies and nonprofit health care providers.

Therefore, they

do not have to increase their premium rates to recoup their tax
payments.

However, Utah Blue Cross has not provided any evi-

dence of any incremental increases in its subscription rate
structure directly attributable to the imposition of the section 31-37-9(2) tax or that demonstrates that any alleged rate
increase would be sufficient to put Utah Blue Cross at a competitive disadvantage

as against MBAs in luring customers to

purchase its policies.

While Utah Blue Cross may have lost

some potential contracts to MBAs, there is nothing in the
record to indicate that those losses were a direct or even
indirect result of the subscription tax imposed upon Utah Blue
Cross.

On the contrary, evidence submitted by the State indi-

cates that Utah Blue Cross may have lost those contracts for
any number of reasons, among them being a preference for one
insurance agent or another, or the fact that the business never
has openly accepted bids in its insurance contracts.
631.)
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(E. 628-

Even if Utah Blue Cross did lose some business because
of the tax, that fact alone is insufficient to indicate that
the tax is unfair.
tremendous business

As has been noted, Utah Blue Cross enjoys a
advantage over the MBAs because of its

ability to contract with providers and because of its relatively large size when compared to the MBAs.
tively

small

organizations.

Most

The MBAs are rela-

of them

have

a limited

clientele and do not compete for other clients or members.

The

legislature acted well within its power when it decided that
the MBAs needed a tax break in order to insure their continued
vitality.
Surely,

Utah Blue Cross does not need a similar tax break.

a rational

reason

for grandfathering

the MBAs and

continuing their tax-exempt status can be perceived by this
Court.

The constitutions require no more.
E.

Utah's Sister States Treat Blue Cross Plans
Differently From MBAs or Insurance Companies
for Legislative Purposes.

The purpose of this subsection is to illustrate that
not only Utah but the other 49 states routinely treat the
various insurance and health care service organizations differently for tax or other purposes.

The following examples cannot

provide exact parallels to the Utah laws because the definition
of MBA, health service corporation, fraternal benefit association and other terms relating to types of insurance companies
varies from state to state, as does the treatment of these
different statutory entities.

These differences in definition
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and treatment make it difficult to determine from the statute
books alone just exactly how Blue Cross is treated in some
states.

These examples from other states will serve to illus-

trate that separate classification of these differing entities
is not irrational.
1.

This section is by no means complete.

Idaho.

The situation in Idaho is very similar to the situation in Utah.

MBAs are treated under one separate chapter of

the insurance code, and Blue Cross is regulated under another
separate chapter of the code.
Chapter 30 of title 41 of the Idaho Code governs
MBAs, and section 3001 provides that "no other provision of
this code shall apply to any such association. . .," with some
stated exceptions.
this chapter.

MBAs may still be formed in Idaho under

Section 3028 levies a 3% tax on the "gross

premiums, dues and other payments received. . . ."by the MBAs
operating in Idaho.
Chapter 34 of title 41 of the Idaho Code governs
"Hospital and Professional Service Corporations."
the

chapter

contained

The scope of

in section 3401 and the definitions

contained in section 3403 make it clear that this chapter
applies to Blue Cross type plans.

Besides other regulatory

differences, this chapter imposes a different tax on Blue Cross
than the tax imposed on MBAs by chapter 30.

Section 3427 of

title 41 was recently amended to raise the tax from one cent
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($.01) per subscribers' contract, per month, to four cents
($.04) per subscribers' contract, per month.

Not knowing the

number of Blue Cross subscribers in Idaho it is impossible to
calculate the amount of the burden imposed by this tax.

How-

ever, it is safe to assume that it is well below the 3% tax
burden imposed on the MBAs.

For our purposes, it is enough to

point out that Idaho treats MBAs and Blue Cross differently for
tax purposes.
2.

Illinois.

The situation in Illinois is even more analogous to
the instant controversy.

There, MBAs are taxed, while Blue

Cross is exempt from tax.
MBAs are governed by 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 73 §§ 928 to
949, a part of the Illinois Insurance Code.

Only MBAs organ-

ized prior to June 29, 1937, may operate under this chapter.
Section 929 grandfathers MBAs organized prior to June 29, 1937.
Section 930 provides that no new MBAs may be organized after
that cutoff date.

MBAs still operating in Illinois are subject

to tax under the insurance code.

111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 73 § 949.

Blue Cross plans are not governed by the Insurance
Code in Illinois.

Instead, Blue Cross plans are governed by

corporation laws under the Non-Profit Hospital Service Plan
Act, 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 551 to 562; the Medical Service
Plan Act, 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 563 to 594.2; the Voluntary
Health Services Plan Act, 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 595 to 624;
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the Medical Corporation Act, 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 631 to
648; the Vision Service Plan Act, 111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 651
to 681; the Dental Service Plan Act, 111. Annot. Stat. Ch. 32
§§ 690.1 to 690.46; and the Pharmaceutical Service Plan Act,
111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 691.1 to 691.45.

This long list

illustrates the variety of rational means available to a legislature to deal with a creature as unique as Blue Cross.
Blue Cross type plans are specifically exempted from
taxation by

111. Ann. Stat. Ch. 32 §§ 562, 590, 621, 678,

690.43 and 691.42.

Blue Cross does not argue in Illinois that

it is so similar to the MBAs that different tax treatment is
constitutionally prohibited.
3.

Michigan.

Blue Cross of Michigan is governed by the Nonprofit
Health Care Corporation Reform Act of 1981, Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. §§ 550.1101 to 550.1704 (West 1983).

Section 550.1201(5)

makes Blue Cross tax-exempt, although this was not always the
case.

See, Op.Atty.Gen. (of Michigan) 1949-50, No. 1036, p.

344.

MBAs are governed by the Fraternal Benefit Societies

Chapter of Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 500.8000 to 500.8254,
and are tax-exempt under section 500.8030.
4.

Arkansas.

In Arkansas, Blue Cross is governed by chapter 49 of
the Insurance Code, the Hospital and Medical Service Corporations Act.

Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-4901 to -4921 (1947).
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Blue

Cross must pay privilege and property taxes, but is exempt from
all other taxes.

Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-4917, 66-4918 (1947).

MBAs were governed in Arkansas under corporation laws
separate from the Insurance Code until 1963.

Ark. Stat. Ann.

§§ 64-1301 to -1308 (1947) (repealed in 1963).

Those sections

were replaced by the Nonprofit Corporations Act, chapter 19 of
title 64 of Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947).

However, existing MBAs

were specifically grandfathered by section 64-1921.

It is not

clear whether existing grandfathered MBAs are subject to tax,
but corporations operating under the Nonprofit Corporations Act
are subject to tax.
5.

Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-1916 (1947).

Colorado.

MBAs in Colorado operated under the Mutual Benefit
Associations part of the Colorado Insurance Code prior to 1981.
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-12-301 to -333 (1973).
specific

tax provision

in that part.

There was no

Those sections were

repealed in 1981, and it is not clear what happened to the
MBAs.

There seems to be no specific grandfather clause.
Blue Cross is governed by the Nonprofit Hospital,

Medical-Surgical, and Health Service Corporation Act.
Rev. Stat. §§ 10-16-101 to -140.
Dental Care Plan Law.

Colorado also has a Prepaid

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-16.5-101 to -116.

These Acts do not contain any specific tax provisions.
6.

Colo.

Other states.
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Other states with specific provisions relating to the
treatment of Blue Cross type plans are Washington, West Virginia,
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas and Oklahoma.
illustrative, and not exhaustive.

This list is

Separate treatment of Blue

Cross type plans could probably be found in the other states as
well.

Such an analysis is not necessary, however, because the

point is adequately made that Blue Cross is considered differently from MBAs or commercial insurance companies in at least a
number of states, if not all states

Surely, if so many state

legislatures have classified Blue Cross plans differently from
other insurance type entities, there must be some rational basis
for the distinction.

Having so showi i, tl le Sta te has carried its

burden in this proceeding.
F.

There Have Been No Admissions By the State.

The following statement appears in Utah Blue Cross1
brief on appeal at page 10:
there

are

"This case is unusual in that

specific admissions by the State

that

the subject

taxing differences under the Insurance Code are inequitable and
that such inequities translate into competitive advantage for
those not paying the tax."
admissions by

(Emphasis added

the State would

be unusad I

.~ue- specific
T

:jee.:.

However,

there have been no such admissionsThis statement, which appears as a part of Utah Blue
Cross' statement c: f material
documents.

facts, refers to two separate

The first is a memorandum to then State Representa-
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tive Gary Brockbank from Roger C. Day, the Commissioner of the
Insurance Department.

The second is a newspaper article from

the February 2, 1983, edition of The Salt Lake Tribune purportedly quoting Governor Scott M. Matheson.

The statements excised

from these documents and characterized by Utah Blue Cross as
specific admissions by the State are examples of the misleading
nature of Utah Blue Cross' statement of material facts.
Even assuming that the documents concerned referred
to the subject matter of this litigation, which they do not,
the fact that the Governor or Commissioner Day made the statements quoted about the insurance system would not be the equivalent

of

"specific

admissions

by the State."

Neither the

Governor nor Commissioner Day is the State of Utah.

Both are

entitled to express their political opinions, but neither's
word is the law of this State.

The fact that there have been

no admissions by the State was brought to the attention of counsel for Utah Blue Cross by Linda Luinstra, Assistant Attorney
General, in a letter dated January 13, 1983.
More

importantly,

neither

subject matter of this litigation.

See, Appendix A.

document

refers

to the

The memorandum of Commis-

sioner Day appears in the Record at pages 409-410.

The basic

tax inequity recognized and discussed by Commissioner Day in
that memorandum

does not

concern Utah

Blue Cross at all.

Commissioner Day states that there is a tax inequity between
the group of self insurers, MBAs, and Health Maintenance Organizations and all of the other more than twelve hundred insurers
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in the State subject to tax.

While Utah Blue Cross is a part

of the group of twelve hundred, it is clear that Commissioner
Day did not have the subject of the similarity or difference of
Utah Blue Cross and the MBAs in mind when these statements were
made.

Utah Blue Cross' statement that this memorandum is an

admission by the State that the business of the MBAs and Utah
Blue Cross "is essentially the same business" is not only
misleading, it is untrue. A cursory reading of this memorandum
will reveal that no such admission was made by Commissioner
Day, much less by the State.
The statements of Governor Matheson have been more
misrepresented than those of Commissioner Day.
the Record at page 414.

They appear in

The article cited refers to rising

health care costs, and the Governor expressed his concerns over
this trend.

As a part of his proposal to deal with the prob-

lem, the Governor proposed an equalization of the tax burden
between self insurers and regulated insurance companies.

Utah

Blue Cross was named in the article as one of the regulated
insurance companies.

No mention at all is made of the MBAs or

the fact that they are not taxed.

This article simply deals

with a different problem and is inapplicable to this case.

The

Governor might very well express a different opinion as to
whether MBAs and health service corporations should be treated
the same for tax purposes.
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POINT III
IF UTAH BLUE CROSS MUST BE TREATED THE SAME AS THE MBAS
FOR TAX PURPOSES, THE PROPER REMEDY IS TO INVALIDATE THE TAX
EXEMPTION OF THE MBAS, NOT TO INVALIDATE THE ENTIRE
TAXING SCHEME OF THE INSURANCE CODE.
Utah Blue Cross is treated differently from the MBAs
because it is taxed under Utah Code Ann. § 31-37-9(2), while
the MBAs are exempted from tax by Utah Code Ann. § 31-14-4(1).
Utah Blue Cross asks this Court to invalidate the tax on it on
constitutional grounds.

The State maintains that both the tax

and the exemption are valid.

In the alternative, the State

argues that if the two entities are so similarly situated that
this Court believes they must be treated the same for tax
purposes, the proper remedy would be to invalidate the exemption, not the tax.

Invalidation of the exemption would impose

a minor burden on the legislative scheme.

On the other hand,

invalidation of the tax would potentially disrupt the entire
insurance tax scheme of title 31.

Either action would achieve

the result which this Court may determine is required.

The

State submits that the former (invalidation of the exemption)
is more rational and involves less judicial legislation than
the latter (invalidation of the tax).
If this Court does find the exemption language of
section 31-14-4(1) to be invalid, it would be proper for the
Court to widen the scope of the insurance tax found in that
section such that all insurance companies transacting business
in the State, including all domestic benefit and cooperative
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benefit associations, would be required to pay the tax.

The

extension of the act's operation through invalidation of the
limiting provision while allowing the remainder of the taxing
scheme to continue in effect would not result in any improper
judicial legislation.

The primary purpose of the statute was

to raise state revenues and the exemption was a secondary
objective.

If the exemption is invalid, the legislature would

surely intend that the tax be extended rather than held invalid
in

its

entirety.

See, Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286

U.S. 165, 185 (1932).
The threat to the entire legislative insurance tax
scheme that would be posed by a judicial invalidation of the
tax on Utah Blue Cross lies in the fact that, by the same
reasoning,

the

commercial

insurance companies could not be

required to pay a tax not also levied on the MBAs and Utah Blue
Cross.

The legislature has already decided that Utah Blue

Cross and the other commercial insurance companies are similarly
situated for tax purposes.

Similarly, the commercial insurers

are in some ways more closely related to the MBAs than is Utah
Blue Cross.

An invalidation of the tax on Utah Blue Cross

would most certainly lead to a proliferation of lawsuits by
other insurance companies subject to the tax.

The tax inequity

complained of by Utah Blue Cross would only be exacerbated by
such an action.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the Defendants, the State
of Utah, the Utah State Tax Commission, and the Utah State
Insurance

Department,

respectfully

request

that

this

Court

affirm the decision and judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting Defendants'
motion for summary judgment.
SUBMITTED this

^^day of July, 1984.

Assistant Attorney

MAR? BETH W£L2
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX A
I. The following list indicates the most obvious differences
between Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah and the Mutual
Benefit Associations:
Blue Cross/Blue Shield
§ 31-37-10
Filing Annual Statement
Certificate ot Authority
Renewal
Filing Certified Copy of
Art. of Incorporation
Amending Art. of Incorporation
Each Agent's Examination
Agent's Qualification License
or Renewal
Agent's Appointment Cert.
or Renewal
Affixing Seal or Commissioner
Filing Policy Forms

MBAs
§ 31-14-1

§50

$100

25

50

50
10
5

25
10

5

25 (2 yrs.)

2
1
0

12 (2 yrs.)
3
10

Filing Rates

Required

Disability Benefits Provided

Reimbursements
31-37-15

Ownership and Control

Apparently
Anyone 31-37-7
Subscribers
do not vote

Ability to Seil Life
Insurance and Annuities

No

Premium Taxes

2 1/4%, 31-37-9

Deposit Requirements

Up to $1,000,000
31-37-14

Not Required
Yes
Policyholders
31-9-11 and 12

Yes
-0-, 31-14-4(1)
$5,000
31-31-13

Guaranty Association
Membership

No 31-37-14(7)

Yes 31-43-1 to -20

Issue Assessable Contracts

No

Yes - Contingent
on surplus 31-31-4
and 31-9-2
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Applicability of Other
Sections ot Utah Code

Partially
31-37-3(1)

Yes
31-31-15

Federal Income Tax
Exemption

Yes

Yes

As or 1969f Mutual Benefit Associations can no longer be formed in
the State of Utah.
II. Other comments on the differences between Blue Cross and Blue
Shield ot Utah and the Mutual Benefit Associations:
The,following is a list of the Mutual Benefit Associations
licensed in Utah that have the premium tax exemption and the
accident and health insurance business they produced during
1981:

Premiums
A l l i e d Mutual Assurance A s s o c i a t i o n
A s s o c i a t e d American Mutual L i f e I n s . Co.
D e s e r e t Mutual B e n e f i t A s s o c i a t i o n
E d u c a t o r s Mutual I n s . A s s o c i a t i o n
E l e c t r i c Mutual B e n e f i t A s s o c i a t i o n
Gem S t a t e Mutual of Utah
Total

No A&H B u s i n e s s
§ 10,828,289
30,854,372
26,516,438
5,845,150
8,924,598
S 82,968,847*

* Total included income for contracts that provided for administrative servicing only.
For the year 1981, the combined total business of Blue Cross and
Blue Shield was as follows:
Risk Business - $51,624,315 and Administrative Services Only $60,060,284**
Total

$111,685,599*

* Does not include the administration of the Medicare program,
which exceeded the total.
** No premium tax on administrative contracts only.
The total income for health programs that are written or processed
through insurance type entities for Utah people was approximately
$370,000,000 (Did not include Medicare).
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In the above list of Mutual Benefit Associations, the following
should be noted:
Allied Mutual

Does not write accident and health
insurance

Associated American

Writes the general public

Deseret Mutual

Writes only the LDS church programs

Educators Mutual

Writes only business associated
with the various educational
systems within the State

Electric Mutual Benefit

Writes only business associated
with Utah Power & Light Co.

Gem State Mutual

Writes the general public

In the State of Utah the normal premium tax is 2 1/4%,of the
net premium collected. However, there is no premium tax on
annuity considerations except on a retaliatory basis. Premium tax
on a "County Mutual" (Bear River) is only one/half of one percent.
Premium taxes on workmen's compensation business is 3 1/4%. There
is no premium tax for health maintenance organizations. There is
a premium tax ot 3% on surplus lines business.
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EXPLANATORY NOTES AND INSURANCE DEPARTMENT COMMENTS
II citations are to the Initial section of the Insurance Code unless otherwise designated es a title or chapter.
O * NO examination required of Blue Cross/Blue Shield solicitors.
AME -Same examination as is required for a regular health insurance agent's license.
.D.-Less detailed examination than is required for a regular health insurance agent's license.
% on Fire and Casualty.
isurance Department Comment - "Filing and approval of contracts is not statutory, however, contracts are approved by department
s a matter ot fact*
'
domestic companies are exempt from premium tax for a period of five years from the date of oiganization and thereafter subject to
tax equal to one-half the existing premium tax.
)nly on foreign corporation authorized to transact business In Arkansas.

*

Jo netti for prior approval of group rates.
Answer applies to Blue Cross only. Blue Shield regulated by Attorney General under the non-profit Service Corporation Statute (Sec
1200 ot California Corporate Code).
Contracts between Blue Cress and the hospital are not filed.
iled for information purposes only.

r

}n Blue Cress only.
Subject to leduction according to percentage of investment of assets In specified Idaho securities.
Domestic insurers must pay a grcss income tax (Title BAt Sec. 2601 ot Indiana Statutes) or may elect to pay a 2% premium tax.
Indiana has a •Tile and Use*' law.
Insurance Department Comment-"By administrative ruling Hospital Service Corporations are subject to the same regulations as Accident & Health Insurers."
$140 on first $7,000 of premiums collected and $170 on each additional $10,000 or fraction thereof, plus $250 annual fee.
Effective 1/1/77 premium tax on domestic companies from 3.2 to 2.4 for 1977 and 1S76 and 2% for subsequent years.
Prior approval of individual rates and certificates. Group rates and contracts subject to subsequent disapproval.
Domestic companies are taxed at the rate of .005 of capital and surplus up to a maximum of $50,000.
Subject to certain conditions under 62C.15.
1975 Montana legislature place the supervision of Blue Cross-Blue Shield under Insurance Department jurisdiction effective July 1, 1975.
Plans are subject to an essessment to defray the cost of the Insurance Department.
Tax is 1.6% of premium income plus 4.5% ot allocated net income.
Statute {Sec. 17?9.0S) piovides for a fee of one cent for each contract issued by every hospital service association to its subscribers.
Domiciled companies pey .3 of 1% of adjusted capital and suiplus.
Foreign companies tax rate subject to reduction according to percentage of assets invested in specified Oklahoma securities.
Individual only.
Subject to reduction for Investment in specified Texas securities.
Subject to up to 1% reduction tor investment in specified West Virginia securities.
Subject to up to 1% reduction tor investment in specified Wyoming securities.

Additional copies of this survey may be obtained by wilting to:
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LIFE UNDERWRITERS
1S22F. Street. N.W.
WasVir.gtcn. DC. 20;'06
A1TN: Lev/Department
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID L WILKINSON
iTTO*N£Y GENERA

n**,£AULM-TiNm
OEFVTr ATTORNEY GENERA

January 1 3 , 1983

Michael R. Murphy
David R. Money
JONES, WALDO, KOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
800 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RS:

JUOUKD L DEWSKU!
Soucnor b*r*n
nUNKLYK B. M A T K E S O N , QUI
GOvtmnitf.itt Altatrs Dntftio
ItOBERT JL WALLACE. Chk
Uttoaiton D m i o
WILUA.MT.EVA.VS.Q*
H%rrar> Resources D"is*o<
DONALD S^COLIMAN.Cn™YVCA Resources Dtvisioi
MARX X.BUCK1. Que
T4* 4 Ei/ttnesj R e s s n e r . &i**<o<

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah vs,
State of Utah, et, al.

Dear Mike and Dave,
Enclosed you will find our answers to your second
set of Requests to Admit and Interrogatories.
We are aware that your Requests No. 2 and No. 3 are
asking us to admit statements made by Roger Day in his August
16, 1978, memo to. Representative Gary Brockbank, a copy of
which has been provided to you* While we would be willing to' •
admit that Mr. Day made those statements, we do not feel compelled to admit that his statements reflect accurate legal
conclusions. Mr. Day is a layman and, of course, is entitled
to his personal opinions.. However, those opinions are not
binding upon the real Defendants in* this-case, which are the
State of Utah, the Insurance Department, and the Tax Commission,
I am sure you can appreciate our duty to advocate the legal
pos^.ion of those governmental entities, regardless of whether
individual state officers and employees express conflicting
viewpoints.
Very^truly yours,

LINDA LUINSTRA
Assistant Attorney General
Tax and Business Regulation Div.
*.* /vlv:
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